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1 Introduction
Most individuals have a tendency to make overly positive evaluations of
their absolute and relative abilities. Positive self-image is a staple finding in
psychology and has been shown to be present in individuals’ self-assessments
of performance in their jobs.1
Baker et al. (1988) cite a survey of General Electric Company employees
according to which 81 percent of a sample of white-collar clerical and techni-
cal workers rated their own performance as falling within the top 20 percent
of their peers in similar jobs.2 Myers (1996) cites a study according to which,
in Australia, 86 percent of people rate their job performance as above av-
erage, 1 percent as below average. Brozynski et al. (2003) find that fund
managers’ hold overly positive views of their relative performance. Ober-
lechner and Osler (2004) find that 75 percent of currency traders in foreign
exchange markets think they are better than average.
The evidence suggests that in settings where individuals’ assessments of
their abilities is a factor that matters for making decisions, then positive
self-image may alter substantially the standard equilibrium predictions of
economic theory. This raises a host of theoretical and empirical questions
that so far have been left unanswered. For example, does the existence of
positive self-image change the firm’s optimal incentive scheme? Does het-
erogeneity in workers’ self images have interesting implications for the com-
position of the workforce? This paper addresses these questions by focusing
on the impact of mistaken beliefs of ability on incentives in organizations.
The paper starts by studying the impact of an agent’s mistaken beliefs
about own ability on the principal’s welfare using the standard principal-
agent model of moral hazard. An agent with mistaken beliefs of own ability
misunderstands his productivity of effort. An agent with a positive (nega-
tive) self-image of own ability over(under)estimates his productivity of ef-
fort.3 The firm is assumed to know about the agent’s mistaken beliefs.4
When effort is observable, the agent’s mistaken beliefs only intervene
in the agent’s willingness to accept the contract offered by the principal.
1According to Myers (1996), a textbook in social psychology, “(...) on nearly any
dimension that is both subjective and socially desirable, most people see themselves as
better than average.”
2 In another study based on the same survey conducted on managerial and professional
employees it was found that 83 percent rated their performance in the top 10 percent.
3Most individuals display positive self-image but some display negative self-image.
4The assumption that the agent holds mistaken beliefs together with the assumption
that the principal is perfectly informed about the agent’s mistaken beliefs are the main
difference between this model and conventional moral-hazard models.
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Because the agent believes that his effort will result in a different level of
output than it actually will (i) the optimal contract should not fully insure
the agent, and (ii) it is cheaper for the principal to implement the intended
action, than in the standard model.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. If effort is observable
the principal can benefit from the agent’s mistaken beliefs by modifying the
contract that would be optimal for an accurate worker to include a bonus in
states that the worker believes are more likely to occur than is actually the
case and a penalty in states that he believes are less likely to occur than is
actually the case. The worker mistakenly views this side-bet as generating
a positive expected payoff and is willing to accept the resulting contract so
long as side-bet is sufficiently small that it does not expose him to too much
risk. In other words, for a small deviation from full insurance the agent’s
mistaken beliefs generate a first-order gain to the principal, whereas risk
aversion generates a second-order loss.
Matters are not so straightforward when effort is unobservable. In this
case, the agent’s mistaken beliefs are no longer necessarily favorable to the
principal. This happens because the agent’s mistaken beliefs now affect his
incentives to exert effort as well as his willingness to accept the contract.
However, the paper shows that it is possible to find conditions under which
the impact of positive (negative) self-image beliefs is always (un)favorable
to the principal: these must ensure that (1) the incentive scheme is nonde-
creasing with output, (2) the only binding constraints are the local downward
incentive compatibility constraints, and (3) positive self-image beliefs and
effort are complements.
If the incentive scheme is nondecreasing with output, then a positive
(negative) self-image agent thinks that he is more (less) likely to earn high
wages than he actually is. Thus, a positive (negative) self-image agent
over(under)estimates the value of the contract when the incentive scheme
is nondecreasing with output. If positive self-image and effort are comple-
ments, then positive self-image makes higher effort relatively more attrac-
tive, slackening the downward incentive constraints which is sufficient for an
overall favorable (unfavorable) impact on incentive constraints given (2).
The paper also argues that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their cowork-
ers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to or-
ganizations than individualistic incentive schemes.5 To make this point the
5Under an individualistic incentive scheme a worker’s payment schedule is only contin-
gent on the outcome of his own task. Under an interdependent incentive scheme a worker’s
payment schedule is contingent on the outcome of his own task as well as the outcome of
others’ tasks.
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possibility that workers hold mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abili-
ties is incorporated in Mookherjee’s (1984) principal multiple-agent model
of moral hazard. A worker with mistaken beliefs of his coworkers’ abilities is
assumed to have an accurate assessment of the productivity of his own effort
but to misperceive the productivity of his coworkers. The firm is assumed to
know about the workers’ mistaken beliefs and workers are assumed to know
about their coworkers’ mistaken beliefs.
The paper finds that if workers have mistaken beliefs about their cowork-
ers’ productivity, then a change of the optimal individualistic incentive
scheme in the direction of an interdependent incentive scheme increases the
firm’s welfare. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. When
workers have mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ productivity and the
firm knows this, the firm can make an advantageous “side bet” by mak-
ing workers’ compensation dependent on their coworkers’ output. The firm
does this by offering workers interdependent contracts that include a bonus
in output states which workers mistakenly believe are more likely to occur
than it is the case, and a penalty in output states which workers mistakenly
believe are less likely to occur than is actually the case. However, the bonus
and penalties can not be too large otherwise this would expose workers to
too much risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the
implications of an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability in a principal
agent model of moral hazard. Section 3 shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs
about their coworkers’ abilities make it more likely that firms want to use
interdependent rather than individualistic contracts. Section 4 discusses the
findings. Section 5 reviews related literature. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Appendix contains the proofs of all results.
2 Mistaken Beliefs about Own Ability in a Prin-
cipal Agent Model
In this section we study the impact of a worker’s mistaken beliefs about
own ability on the firm’s welfare using the canonical principal-agent model
of moral hazard. According to this model a principal hires an agent to
produce output. Output is a stochastic function of effort. When the agent’s
effort is not directly observable by the principal, the principal can only offer
a contract based on the observable and verifiable output levels.
There exists a finite set of possible levels of output, Q = {q1, . . . , qM} , a
finite set of possible effort levels,A = {a1, . . . , aN} , and output is stochastic,
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given effort. Let pm (an) denote the probability of output level qm resulting
if the effort level is an. Every output level is possible under any effort level,
that is, pm (an) > 0 for all n and m. An increase in effort results in a
higher probability of higher levels of output, that is, for all pairs n and n0
such that n > n0, p (an) first-order stochastically dominates p (an0) , where
p (an) = (p1 (an) , . . . , pM (an)) .
The agent is allowed to hold mistaken beliefs of his productivity. That
is, p̃ (an) 6= p (an) , for at least one n, where p̃ (an) denotes the agent’s
perception of the marginal distribution of output induced by effort level
n. An agent with mistaken beliefs about own ability is assumed to always
perceive high effort to be more productive than low effort, that is, for all
pairs n and n0 such that n0 > n, p̃ (an0) first-order stochastically dominates
p̃ (an) .
The agent exhibits positive self-image of own ability if p̃ (an) 6= p (an) ,
for at least one n, and p̃ (an) first-order stochastically dominates p (an), for
all n. The agent exhibits negative self-image of own ability if p̃ (an) 6= p (an) ,
for at least one n, and p (an) first-order stochastically dominates p̃ (an), for
all n. The agent exhibits accurate self-image of own ability if p̃ (an) ≡ p (an),
for all n.6
The agent is assumed to be risk averse with a utility function that is sep-
arable in income and effort, U (y, a) = u (y)−c (a), with u strictly increasing
and concave and c increasing. The agent’s ex ante utility from accepting
the contract must be at least his reservation utility level, Ū .
The principal is risk neutral and cares only about maximizing profits,
the difference between expected benefits and expected wages. The principal
is assumed to be perfectly informed about the agent’s true productivity and
also about the agent’s mistaken beliefs.
The assumption that the principal knows about the agent’s mistaken be-
liefs should be viewed as a reasonable simplification. The psychological evi-
dence that individuals are prone to overestimate their abilities is widespread
and publicly available. If the bias is systematic, the principal could at least
be expected to make a good guess about the mistaken beliefs of a particular
agent by assuming that the agent overestimates his ability.
6Note that according to this definition an agent with positive self-image of own ability
might not overestimate his productivity at all effort levels. However, it is certain that he
never underestimates it.
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2.1 Observable Effort
We begin our analysis by studying the impact of mistaken beliefs about own
ability on the principal’s welfare when effort is observable. In this case the
contract that the principal offers to the agent specifies the agent’s effort and
his wage as a function of observed output. It is a standard result in the
agency literature that when effort is observable and the agent is risk averse
the optimal solution to the principal’s effort implementation problem is to
fully insure the agent against risk. Hence, given the contract’s specification
of effort, the principal offers a fixed wage such that the agent receives exactly
his reservation utility. Proposition 1 shows that this result is no longer valid
when the agent misperceives his productivity.
Proposition 1 In the principal-agent model with observable effort, risk
neutral principal, and risk averse agent, if the agent holds mistaken beliefs
about his productivity, the principal knows about the agent’s beliefs as well
his true productivity, then (i) the optimal contract should not fully insure the
agent, and (ii) the cost to the principal of implementing an arbitrary action
is lower or equal than in the standard model.
When the agent holds mistaken beliefs about his productivity and ef-
fort is observable full insurance is still a feasible solution to the principal’s
effort implementation problem so the principal can’t do worse. However,
the difference in beliefs generates a beneficial side-bet to the principal. The
principal can do better by offering the agent a contract that includes a side
bet that pays a bonus in states that the worker believes are more likely to
occur than is actually the case and a penalty in states that he believes are
less likely to occur than is actually the case.
The agent’s risk aversion implies that the shift from a contract that fully
insures the agent to a contract with a side bet has a cost. The side bet
makes the agent’s payment contingent on output and therefore increases
risk. Proposition 1 shows that for a small enough side bet the reduction
in compensation cost due to the impact of the agent’s mistaken beliefs on
the participation constraint dominates the increase in compensation cost
associated with the agent’s risk aversion. This is because, for a small side
bet, the impact of the agent’s mistaken beliefs is of first-order whereas the
impact of risk aversion is of second-order.7
7 If an agent is risk neutral and has mistaken beliefs the principal’s problem does not
have a solution. In this case the principal can always increase profits by raising the stakes
of the side bet. However, if the agent is risk neutral and is protected by limited liability
this situation does not arise since at a certain poin the limited liability constraint becomes
biding and this prevents the principal from increasing the bet anyfurther.
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2.2 Unobservable Effort
When effort is unobservable and the principal wants the agent to choose
effort level an the principal’s effort implementation problem is given by
min
{vm}
X
m
pm (an)h (vm)
s.t.
X
m
p̃m (an) vm − c (an) ≥ Ū (1)X
m
[p̃m (an)− p̃m (an0)] vm ≥ c (an)− c (an0) , ∀ an0 6= an, (2)
where h ≡ u−1, (1) is the participation constraint and (2) represents the set
of incentive compatibility constraints.
When effort is unobservable the impact of mistaken beliefs about own
ability on the principals’ welfare becomes more interesting. Now, besides
their impact on the participation constraint, mistaken beliefs about own
ability also have an impact on the agent’s incentives to exert effort.
When effort is unobservable, the paper distinguishes between two effects
that an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability have on the principal’s
welfare. The participation effect concerns the impact of mistaken beliefs
about own ability on the agent’s willingness to accept the contract offered
by the principal for a fixed wage incentive scheme. The incentive effect
concerns the impact of mistaken beliefs about own ability on the set of
incentive compatibility constraints for a fixed wage incentive scheme.
To explain the impact of these two effects of mistaken beliefs on the
principal’s effort implementation problem suppose that there are only two
output and two possible effort levels. In this case, if the principal prefers
to implement low effort the results of Proposition 1 apply: the principal
is better off with an agent with mistaken beliefs than with an accurate
agent. However, if the principal prefers to implement high effort then the
agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability have an impact on the agent’s
incentives to exert effort. If the agent perceives the productivity of high
and low effort to be more similar than they actually are, then there is an
unfavorable impact of mistaken beliefs on incentives since the returns to high
effort become less attractive to the agent by comparison with the returns to
low effort. Of course, if the opposite happens there is a favorable impact of
mistaken beliefs on incentives.
When there are only two output and two effort levels and the principal
prefers to implement high effort the impact of mistaken beliefs on the par-
ticipation constraint can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal.
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To see this let us start by recalling the features of the optimal solution to
the principal’s high effort implementation problem when effort is unobserv-
able and the agent has an accurate self-image. In this case high effort can
only be implemented if the principal offers the agent a high wage for high
output and a low wage for low output. Now suppose that the principal faces
a positive self-image agent who overestimates the productivity of high effort
and that the principal offers this agent the optimal contract designed for an
accurate agent. The fact that the optimal contract for the accurate agent
has a wage-incentive schedule that is strictly increasing in output implies
that the positive self-image agent values it more than the accurate agent.
This happens because the positive self-image agent thinks that he is more
likely to produce high output and hence to earn a high wage than an accu-
rate agent. In this case the impact of mistaken beliefs on the participation
constraint is favorable to the principal. The opposite happens if the prin-
cipal faces a negative self-image agent who underestimates the productivity
of high effort.
The result that positive self-image has a favorable impact on the par-
ticipation constraint while negative self-image has an unfavorable impact is
valid for two output levels and two effort levels case but does not extend to
cases where there are more than two output levels. For example, it is well
known in the agency literature that if there are two effort levels and more
than two output levels the wage-incentive scheme that implements high ef-
fort need not be strictly increasing in output. If the wage-incentive scheme
is non-monotonic in output then it is easy to construct examples where pos-
itive self-image has an unfavorable impact on the participation constraint.
This observation leads us to our next result.
Lemma 1 In the principal-agent model with unobservable effort, if the
principal prefers to implement effort level an and the optimal wage-incentive
scheme for an accurate agent is nondecreasing in output, then for an agent
with positive self-image
Ep̃(an) [U ((y
∗
m) , an)] ≥ Ep(an) [U ((y∗m) , an)] ,
while for an agent with negative self-image
Ep̃(an) [U ((y
∗
m) , an)] ≤ Ep(an) [U ((y∗m) , an)] ,
where (y∗m) is the optimal wage-incentive scheme for an accurate agent.
Lemma 1 follows because integrating an increasing function against or-
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dered measures preserves the order and so we omit its proof.8 This result
states that if the optimal contract is nondecreasing in output, then a positive
(negative) self-image agent over(under)estimates its value since he thinks
that he is more (less) likely to earn high wages than he actually is.
Note that a wage-incentive scheme that is nondecreasing with output
can be the result of characteristics of the technology and preferences of the
problem.9 For example, if the monotone-likelihood ratio condition (MLRC)
and the concavity of the distribution function condition (CDFC) are satisfied
then the optimal wage-incentive scheme is nondecreasing with output.10
We will make use of MLRC, CDFC, and Lemma 1 in our next result. Be-
fore that we need to introduce one definition. Let f(an) ≡ p̃(an)−p(an).We
say that self-image and effort are complements if and only if
Pk
m fm(an) ≤Pk
m fm(an0) for all k = 1, . . . ,M , and for all pairs n and n
0 such that
n > n0. We say that self-image and effort are substitutes if and only ifPk
m fm(an) ≥
Pk
m fm(an0) for all k = 1, . . . ,M , and for all pairs n and n
0
such that n > n0. These two definitions capture the idea that an increase in
effort can be associated with an increase or a decrease in the increment of
positive self-image beliefs. We are now ready to state our next result.
Proposition 2 In the principal-agent model with unobservable effort, risk
neutral principal, and risk averse agent, if MRLC and CDFC hold, self-
image and effort are complements, and the principal knows about the agent’s
beliefs, then the cost to the principal of implementing an arbitrary action is
lower (higher) or equal with an agent with positive (negative) self-image
beliefs than with an agent with accurate beliefs.
Proposition 2 identifies conditions under which the impact of positive
self-image is always favorable to the principal and the impact of negative
self-image is always unfavorable. The intuition behind this result is as fol-
lows. If MRLC and CDFC hold, then the optimal incentive scheme is non-
decreasing with output. If the optimal incentive scheme is nondecreasing
with output, then we know from Lemma 1 that, for a fixed wage incentive
scheme, positive self-image slackens the participation constraint. Addition-
8We have that ym increases in m, and U increases in y. When the agent has positive
self-image p̃ (an) stochastically dominates p (an) .
9A wage-incentive scheme that is nondecreasing with output can also be the result of
constraints on the set of feasible incentive schemes. For an example see Grossman and
Hart (1983).
10The monotone-likelihood ratio condition says that a higher effort level increases the
likelihood of a high output level more than the likelihood of a low production level. The
concavity of the distribution function condition says that increases in effort have decreasing
marginal impact on the probability of higher output levels being attained.
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ally, if MRLC and CDFC hold the only incentive constraints that matter
are the local downward incentive constraints. This and the assumption that
self-image and effort are complements imply that, for a fixed wage incentive
scheme, positive self-image also slackens the incentive constraints since it
makes high effort relatively more attractive to the agent than low effort.11
3 Mistaken Beliefs about Coworkers’ Abilities in
a Principal Multiple-Agent Model
We are interested in finding out if workers’ mistaken beliefs about their
relative abilities have an impact on the firm’s choice of optimal incentive
scheme. More specifically, we want to know if workers’ mistaken beliefs
about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent contracts more attrac-
tive to firms than individualistic contracts. To find an answer to this ques-
tion we introduce worker mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities in
Mookherjee’s (1984) principal-multiple-agent model of moral hazard.
In this model a principal (firm) hires two agents (workers). After signing
a contract with the firm each worker takes an unobservable action. The level
of output, which depends on the worker’s action and the realization of a
random variable, is publicly observed and workers are compensated on the
basis of the output realizations.
There exists for each worker k a finite set of possible levels of output,
Qk = {q1, . . . , qn} , a finite set of possible actions, Ak, a random variable
θk (with finite range Hk) and a production function fk
¡
a1, a2, θk
¢
: A1 ×
A2 ×Hk → Qk. The production function determines for any pair of actions¡
a1, a2
¢
and any realization of the random variable θk, a unique output
for worker k. The random variables θ1 and θ2 have a joint probability
distribution represented by g
¡
θ1, θ2
¢
. The production functions f1 and f2
together with the joint distribution g of θ1 and θ2 induce a probability
distribution over output pairs
¡
q1, q2
¢
for any given pair of actions
¡
a1, a2
¢
.
Let pij
¡
a1, a2
¢
denote the probability of output pair
³
q1i , q
2
j
´
resulting if the
actions are
¡
a1, a2
¢
.
Workers are assumed to be risk averse with a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function Uk which is additively separable in monetary reward, yk, and
11 If self-image and effort are substitutes, then the impact of positive self-image on the
participation constraint would still be favorable to the principal but the impact on the
incentive constraints would be unfavorable. In this case the impact of positive self-image
beliefs on the principal’s welfare is ambiguous.
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action chosen. That is,
Uk
³
yk, ak
´
= uk
³
yk
´
− ck
³
ak
´
,
where possible rewards by the firm range over a closed interval
£
ykL, y
k
H
¤
.
Worker k is assumed to have a reservation utility of Ūk which represents the
minimum payment he must be given to sign the contract with the firm. It
is further assumed that:
(i) uk is continuous, strictly increasing and concave over
£
ykL, y
k
H
¤
;
(ii) if akL ∈ Ak minimizes ck
¡
ak
¢
over Ak then uk
¡
ykL
¢
− ck
¡
akL
¢
< Ūk;
(iii) if akH ∈ Ak maximizes ck
¡
ak
¢
over Ak then uk
¡
ykH
¢
− ck
¡
akH
¢
> Ūk.
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral and to be concerned exclusively
with the maximization of profits, the difference between expected benefits
and expected compensation costs. Hence if B̂
¡
q1, q2
¢
is the benefit function
of the firm then expected benefits when actions chosen by the workers are¡
a1, a2
¢
are equal to
B
¡
a1, a2
¢
=
X
i
X
j
pij
¡
a1, a2
¢
B̂
¡
q1i , q
2
j
¢
.
If the firm is unable to observe workers’ actions, then payment can only
be made contingent on workers’ outputs. In this case an incentive scheme
for worker k is an n1×n2 dimensional vector
³
ykij
´
∈
£
ykL, y
k
H
¤n×n
where ykij
is the compensation given to worker k if the output pair
³
q1i , q
2
j
´
results.
Given a pair
³³
y1ij
´
,
³
y2ij
´´
of incentive schemes and an action pair
¡
a1, a2
¢
the firm incurs an expected compensation cost of
C
¡
a1, a2,
¡
y1ij
¢
,
¡
y2ij
¢¢
=
X
i
X
j
pij
¡
a1, a2
¢ ¡
y1ij + y
2
ij
¢
.
The firm will choose a pair of incentive schemes
³³
y1ij
´
,
³
y2ij
´´
and an
action pair
¡
a1, a2
¢
which maximize expected profits subject to the con-
straints that the action pair
¡
a1, a2
¢
is a Nash equilibrium for the workers
under
³³
y1ij
´
,
³
y2ij
´´
, and that they attain an expected utility of at least
Ūk in equilibrium.
Recall that our goal is find out if workers mistaken beliefs about their
coworkers’ abilities make interdependent contracts more desirable to the
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firm than individualistic contracts. This implies that we need to rule out
alternative explanations for interdependent contracts to be more attractive
to the firm than individualistic contracts.
We know from Mookherjee (1984) that, in the absence of workers’ mis-
taken beliefs, a sufficient condition for optimal payments to worker 1 to be
independent of worker 2’s output is that worker 1’s output is a sufficient
statistic for a1.12 A corollary of this result is that if the production func-
tions are separable in actions (an absence of production externalities), the
random variables θ1 and θ2 are independent (an absence of common uncer-
tainty), and workers have accurate beliefs, then individualistic contracts are
optimal.13
Thus, we assume that workers’ production functions are separable in
actions and that the random variables θ1 and θ2 are independent. If this is
the case we have that
pij
¡
a1, a2
¢
= pi
¡
a1
¢
pj
¡
a2
¢
,
where pi
¡
a1
¢
denotes the probability of output q1i resulting from action a
1
and pj
¡
a2
¢
denotes the probability of output q2j resulting from action a
2.
We now extend Mookherjee’s model to include the possibility that work-
ers’ hold mistaken beliefs about their coworker’s abilities. Let pk
¡
ak
¢
denote
worker k’s beliefs regarding his own marginal distribution of qk given ak and
let pk
¡
al
¢
denote worker k’s beliefs regarding worker l’s marginal distribu-
tion of ql given al. To allow for workers to have mistaken beliefs about their
coworkers’ abilities we assume that each worker k = 1, 2 has a correct belief
of his own ability but has an incorrect belief of worker l’s ability, l 6= k. That
is, we assume that worker k’s beliefs regarding his own marginal distribu-
tion of qk given ak match his actual marginal distribution, pk
¡
ak
¢
= p
¡
ak
¢
k = 1, 2, and that worker k’s beliefs regarding worker l’s marginal distribu-
tion of ql given al differ from worker l’s actual marginal distribution of ql
given al, pk
¡
al
¢
6= p
¡
al
¢
, l 6= k, k = 1, 2.
We also assume that if a worker has mistaken beliefs about his coworker’s
relative ability, then he thinks that his coworker’s perception of relative abil-
ity is mistaken, while he thinks that his own perception of relative ability is
12That is, worker 2’s output is uninformative about worker 1’s action and therefore
worker 1’s compensation should not depend on worker 2’s output (if it did this would
only increase the randomness in worker 1’s compensation without any gains in terms of
inference about worker 1’s action).
13This is because if θ1 and θ2 are independent the joint distribution of
¡
q1, q2
¢
given¡
a1, a2
¢
can be decomposed into the product of the marginal distributions of q1 given a1
and q2 given a2.
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correct. Finally, we assume that workers “agree to disagree” about their per-
ceptions of relative ability. Squintani (2005) shows that this last assumption
rules out a conflict between mistaken beliefs and equilibrium in the workers’
simultaneous action choice subgame.14 The firm is assumed to know about
the workers mistaken beliefs.
Analogous to Grossman and Hart’s (1983) analysis of the single-agent
problem we know that the firm’s problem can be decomposed into two
parts: the effort implementation problem and the effort selection problem.15
The analysis will focus on the implementation problem since we know from
Mookherjee (1984) that the qualitative properties of the optimal incentive
scheme can be deduced from it. The goal is to show that if workers have
mistaken beliefs of their relative abilities, interdependent contracts are bet-
ter for the firm than individualistic contracts. The method of proof consists
in showing that for any actions that can be implemented by an individualis-
tic incentive scheme there exists a feasible interdependent incentive scheme
that implements the same actions at a lower cost.
Proposition 3 If production functions are separable in actions, random
variables θ1 and θ2 are independent, workers are risk averse and have mis-
taken beliefs of their coworkers’ productivities, the firm is risk neutral and
knows about workers’ beliefs, then the cost to the firm of implementing an
arbitrary action pair is lower under an interdependent incentive scheme than
under an individualistic one.
Proposition 3 shows that when the firm knows that workers have mis-
taken beliefs of their coworkers’ abilities then the firm can make an advan-
tageous “side bet.” The firm does this by offering workers interdependent
contracts that increase compensation for outcomes that the workers’ mistak-
enly think are more frequent and decrease compensation for outcomes that
the workers’ mistakenly think are less frequent. If workers have positive
self-image of their relative abilities the firm should increase compensation
in output pairs where a worker’s opponent has a low output and reduce
14Kruger (1998) presents evidence that suggests that people expect others to have pos-
itive self images. If a worker is not aware of his opponent’s mistaken beliefs of relative
ability then his opponent may choose an action that is not expected by him, that is, there
is no equilibrium.
15 In the implementation problem the firm, for any arbitrary action pair
¡
a1, a2
¢
, chooses
the incentive schemes that minimize the firm’s expected compensation cost subject to the
Nash incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint. In the effort
selection problem the firm, given the solution to the implementation problem, chooses the
action pair
¡
a1, a2
¢
that maximizes the difference between expected benefits and imple-
mentation costs.
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compensation in output pairs where a worker’s opponent has a high output
by comparison with the optimal individualistic incentive scheme. If workers
have negative self-image the opposite procedure should be taken.
Worker risk aversion implies that the shift from an individualistic in-
centive scheme to an interdependent incentive scheme has a cost. Making
each worker’s payment contingent on his own and on his opponent’s output
increases risk by comparison with the case when a worker’s payment is only
contingent on his own output. Proposition 3 shows that for small enough
changes in the direction of an interdependent incentive scheme the reduc-
tion in implementation cost due to the workers’ mistaken beliefs dominates
the increase in implementation cost due to the workers’ risk aversion. The
reason behind this result is that the impact of workers’ mistaken beliefs on
implementation cost is of first-order (influences the first derivative of the
objective function) whereas the impact of workers’ risk aversion is of second
order (influences only the second derivative).16
The method of proof of Proposition 3 uses the assumption that workers
have accurate beliefs about their own productivity. The result also holds
with the same method of proof if workers have mistaken beliefs about their
own productivity and the firm is aware of that. However, the result does not
hold if workers have mistaken beliefs about their own productivity and the
firm is not aware of that. If workers are mistaken about their own abilities
unbeknownst to the firm, then the firm might offer them a contract which
they mistakenly perceive to give them a lower payoff than their reservation
payoff.
The assumption that there is no common uncertainty allows the firm
to design a side bet that reduces implementation cost without having any
impact on the workers’ incentives. We cannot show that relaxing this as-
sumption allows the firm to design a side bet that reduces implementation
cost.
4 Discussion
This section analyzes the impact of worker mistaken beliefs on worker wel-
fare, discusses alternative definitions of positive self-image, and explores the
implications of the findings for firm and worker behavior.
16 If workers are risk neutral the interdependent implementation problem has no solution:
the firm and the workers are both willing to make a side bet and scale it to infinity.
However, if workers are risk neutral and are protected by limited liability this situation
does not arise since the limited liability constraints become binding and prevent the firm
from increasing the bet.
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4.1 Worker Welfare
In this paper, workers’ ex-ante perceived payoffs are equal to their reser-
vation utilities but their ex-ante actual payoffs may be different from their
reservation utilities. This result is not surprising given that workers are
making their decisions based on biased perceptions of their abilities, that is,
they do not maximize the correct payoff function.
To study the impact of worker mistaken beliefs on worker welfare we
take the point of view of an outside observer, who knows the worker’s actual
productivity of effort.17 If effort is observable, then the worker is worse
off by holding mistaken beliefs about own ability since these lead him to
accept unfavorable gambles. If effort is unobservable and the conditions of
Proposition 2 hold, then worker positive (negative) self-image of own ability
makes the worker worse (better) off relative to an accurate worker.
4.2 Alternative Definitions
In this paper workers overestimate their absolute or relative productivity in
the firm but have an accurate assessment of their cost of effort and of their
outside option. There could be other ways of thinking about workers views
of their abilities.
A worker with a positive self-image might overestimate the value of his
outside option while having a correct assessment of his productivity in the
firm and of his cost of effort. In this case, whether effort is observable
or unobservable, positive self-image is always unfavorable to the firm but
favorable to the worker. This happens because a worker who overestimates
his outside option must be paid more to accept the contract than a worker
who assesses his outside option correctly. This definition of worker positive
self-image has opposite welfare implications for the firm (and for the worker)
as the ones obtained in this paper.18
Another possibility might be that a worker with a positive self-image
underestimates his cost of effort but assesses correctly his productivity in the
firm and his outside option. In this case, if worker underestimation of cost
17The worker’s welfare could also be assessed as he perceives it ex ante, that is, using the
worker’s perception of his productivity of effort. However, the worker will not experience
this welfare on average ex post.
18A referee suggested that a positive self-image agent might simultaneously overestimate
his productivity in the firm and the value of his outside option. The impact of this type
of positive self-image on the agent’s willingness to accept the contract is ambiguous, both
in the observable as well as in the unobservable effort case. So, this alternative definition
has no clear cut welfare implications for the firm and for the worker.
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of effort is increasing with effort, then there is a favorable incentive effect for
the firm.19 A worker who underestimates the cost of effort can also be paid
less to participate in the tournament than a worker who assesses his cost of
effort correctly. So, according to this definition, if worker underestimation
of cost of effort is increasing with effort, then positive self-image is favorable
to the firm.20
4.3 Implications of Findings
The paper shows that, everything else equal, if effort is observable, then the
firm should have a preference for hiring workers who have mistaken beliefs of
their abilities rather than workers who hold correct beliefs of their abilities.
When effort is unobservable this need no longer be the case.
Proposition 3 shows that if a firm is aware that workers have mistaken
assessments of the ability of their coworkers, effort is unobservable, and there
are no production externalities, then the firm prefers to offer interdependent
incentive schemes to workers than individualistic ones. Under these circum-
stances, holding everything else equal, the firm would prefer to hire workers
who are mistaken about their coworkers’ skills rather than workers who are
not.
In settings where performance depends on relative ability positive self-
image leads individuals to overestimate the probability of favorable out-
comes. If this is the case individuals should, on average, prefer incentive
schemes featuring payments contingent on relative performance (e.g., rank-
order tournaments or incentive schemes composed partly by fixed pay and
partly by variable pay dependent on the magnitude of relative performance)
to individualistic incentive schemes (e.g., fixed salary plans or piece rates).
5 Related Literature
This paper is related to a recent strand of literature in behavioral economics
that studies the welfare consequences of biases in judgment. The paper
focuses on the welfare implications of worker positive self-image and is closely
related to papers that study the impact of biased beliefs on the employment
relationship.21
19The opposite happens if underestimation of cost of effort is decreasing with effort.
20 If overestimation of cost of effort is increasing with effort, then negative self-image is
unfavorable to the firm.
21Some papers—e.g. Keiber (2003)—study the impact of overestimation of the precision
of one’s knowledge on the employment relationship. Other papers—e.g. Fairchild (2005)—
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This literature can be divided into two approaches. The first approach
assumes that the firm is better informed about the worker’s skill than the
worker. The worker and the firm may have common or different prior beliefs
about the worker’s skill. The firm uses the contract offered to the worker
to given him incentives but also to give him a signal about his skill. Under
this approach a worker’s beliefs about skill are endogenous to the model.
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) and Moscarini and Fang (2005) are examples of
papers that follow this approach.
The second approach also assumes that the firm is better informed about
a worker’s skill than the worker. The firm and the worker have different
prior beliefs about the worker’s ability. The firm knows about the worker’s
skill and may also know the worker’s beliefs about skill. The firm takes
advantage of being better informed to design the incentive scheme. Under
this approach there is no signalling by the firm and worker’s beliefs about
skill are exogenous to the model. The current paper follows this approach.
Other examples are Hvide (2002), Gervais and Goldstein (2004) and De la
Rosa (2005).
Hvide (2002) considers a principal-agent model in which a worker chooses
beliefs about his own ability, and provides conditions under which there
is a strategic advantage for selecting beliefs that overestimate true ability.
The advantage arises through commitment effects. A worker can gain from
overestimating his skill if that improves his bargaining position against the
firm (outside option). The firm is made worse off by the workers biased
beliefs.
Gervais and Goldstein (2004) study the impact of worker overestimation
of own productivity in teams. In that context it is shown that if there are
complementarities between workers’ efforts, then the team is better off with
a workforce that overestimates absolute productivity. The intuition for this
result is simple, a worker who overestimates her own marginal productivity
works harder, thereby increasing the marginal productivity of her teammates
who then work harder as well. Thus, positive self-image can help alleviating
the free-riding and coordination problems in teams.22
De la Rosa (2005) considers the welfare effects of worker overestimation
look at the implications of managerial optimism for financing decisions by firms (debt or
equity). Here, I focus on papers that study the implications of worker overestimation of
skill on the agency relationship.
22This finding is valid as long as worker overestimation of relative productivity comes
mainly from overestimation of own productivity. In fact, the welfare results obtained
in their paper are reversed if overestimation of relative productivity comes mainly from
underestimation of the productivity of the other team members.
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of own productivity when different firms compete to contract with a risk
averse worker. He considers a set-up where the worker has two actions
(effort or no effort) and there are two possible outcomes: success or failure.
The firm knows about the worker’s true productivity and knows that the
worker overestimates the probability of success given that he exerts effort.
This is the dual approach to the one used here since competition between
firms drives expected profits to zero and the worker enjoys all the surplus
generated by the employment relationship. De la Rosa finds that a risk
averse worker benefits from moderate positive self-image but may be hurt
from high positive self-image.
The main contribution of this paper to this literature is to show, using
an optimal contracting framework, how firms can structure incentives to
take advantage of individuals’ inflated self-perceptions of skill. This result
stands in contrast to Hvide (2002) and does not rely on the assumption of
complementarity between workers’ efforts present in Gervais and Goldstein
(2004).
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities have inter-
esting implications for the design of incentives in organizations. If effort is
observable and the worker has mistaken beliefs of his productivity then, (i)
the optimal contract should not fully insure the worker, and (ii) it is cheaper
for the firm to implement the intended action, than in the standard model.
By contrast, if effort is unobservable worker’s mistaken beliefs are no longer
necessarily favorable to the firm. The paper also shows that if workers mis-
perceive the productivity of their coworkers, then this makes interdependent
incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic ones.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 If effort is observable, the principal faces an agent
with an accurate self-image, and the principal prefers to induce effort level
an, then it is a standard result that if the agent is risk averse, the optimal
compensation scheme is a fixed wage payment such that the agent receives
exactly his reservation utility level. That is v∗m = Ū + c (an), for all m. So,
when the agent has an accurate self-image the principal’s implementation
costs are given by
C (an, (v
∗
m)) = h
¡
Ū + c (an)
¢
.
If effort is observable, the principal faces an agent with mistaken beliefs
about own ability, and the principal prefers to induce effort level an, then
the principal’s implementation problem is given by
min
{vm}
X
pm (an)h (vm)
s.t.
X
p̃m (an) vm − c (an) ≥ Ū .
If p̃ (an) = p (an) then the agent does not hold mistaken beliefs about effort
level an and the principal’s implementation cost is the same as with an
accurate agent. If p̃ (an) 6= p (an) then the agent holds mistaken beliefs
about effort level an. If p̃ (an) 6= p (an) then there exist at least two output
levels qi and qj such that p̃i (an) > pi (an) and p̃j (an) < pj (an) , with i 6= j.
If zi = 1, zj = −pi (an) /p̃j (an) , and zk = 0, for all k 6= i, j, thenX
m
pm (an) zm < 0 <
X
m
p̃m (an) zm,
for p (an) 6= p̃ (an). Let (v̂m) denote the incentive scheme that adds εzm
to the agent’s output contingent utility payments when the agent’s output
is qm. That is, v̂m = v∗m + εzm, with ε > 0. We will show that: (1) (v̂m)
is feasible in the principal’s implementation problem with an agent with
mistaken beliefs and (2) (v̂m) has a lower implementation cost than (v∗m) for
small ε. Let us consider (1) first. It is obvious that (v̂m) satisfies the agent’s
participation constraint. Let us now consider (2). Taking a second-order
Taylor series expansion of h around the individualistic output contingent
utility payments we have that
h (v) ≈ h (v∗) + h0 (v∗) (v − v∗) + 1
2
h00 (v∗) (v − v∗)2 . (3)
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Making use of (3), the implementation cost of (v̂m) is approximately equal
to
C (an, (v̂m)) ≈
X
pm (an)
∙
h (v∗m) + h
0 (v∗m) εzm +
1
2
h00 (v∗m) (εzm)
2
¸
,
or, after taking into account that v∗m = Ū+c (an) , for all m, and simplifying
terms
C (an, (v̂m)) ≈ h
¡
Ū + c (an)
¢
+ εh0
¡
Ū + cH
¢X
pm (an) zm
+
1
2
ε2h00
¡
Ū + cH
¢X
pm(an)z
2
m. (4)
The second term on the right hand side of (4) is negative given that h0 is
positive and
P
pm (an) zm is negative. The third term on the right hand
side of (4) is positive since agent risk aversion implies that h00 is positive.
However, for a small enough ε the second term on the right hand side of (4) is
larger than the third. This implies that C (an, (v̂m)) < C (an, (v∗m)). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 If MRLC and CDFC hold, then we know from
Proposition 8 in Grossman and Hart (1983) that the optimal incentive
scheme is nondecreasing with output. If the optimal incentive scheme is
nondecreasing with output, then it follows from Lemma 1 that positive self-
image slackens the participation constraint. If MRLC and CDFC hold, then
we also know from Grossman and Hart (1983) that the only binding incen-
tive constraints are the local downward incentive constraints. If that is the
case the principal’s problem is reduced to
min
{vm}
X
m
pm (an)h (vm)
s.t.
X
m
p̃m (an) vm − c (an) ≥ ŪX
m
[p̃m (an)− p̃m (an0)] vm ≥ c (an)− c (an0) , an 6= an0 , n > n0.
The definition of complementarity between positive self-image and effort
implies that we can rewrite the incentive constraints asX
m
[pm (an)− pm (an0)] vm +
X
m
[fm (an)− fm (an0)] vm ≥ c (an)− c (an0) ,
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an 6= an0 , n > n0. Since v1 ≤ . . . ≤ vM ,
P
m fm (an) = 0, and
Pk
m fm (an) ≤Pk
m fm (an0) ∀k = 1, . . . ,M it follows that
P
m [fm (an)− fm (an0)] vm ≥ 0,
which implies that the incentive constraint is slackened. If, for a fixed wage
incentive scheme, this type of positive self-image beliefs slackens both the
participation and the incentive constraints, then the principal’s set of feasible
incentive schemes is larger with an agent with this type of positive self-image
beliefs than with an agent with accurate beliefs. If that is the case then the
cost of implementing an arbitrary action pair is lower or equal with an
agent with this type of positive self-image beliefs than with an agent with
accurate beliefs. Similarly, since under the condition assumed negative self-
image worsens both the participation and incentive constraints, the cost of
implementing an arbitrary action pair is higher or equal with an agent with
negative self-image beliefs than with an agent with accurate beliefs. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 To make the argument simple and clear we focus
on a single agent. Suppose the firm wishes to implement action pair
¡
ak, al
¢
through an individualistic incentive scheme. Let the individualistic incentive
scheme (v∗i ) , where v
∗
i is the utility payment to worker k if he produces qi,
be the solution to
min
{vi}
X
i
pi
³
ak
´
h (vi)
s.t.
X
i
pi
³
ak
´
vi − c
³
ak
´
≥ ŪX
i
h
pi
³
ak
´
− pi (a)
i
vi ≥ c
³
ak
´
− c (a) , a ∈ Ak, a 6= ak,
where h ≡ u−1. We call this problem the individualistic implementation
problem. The implementation cost to the firm of using the optimal individ-
ualistic incentive scheme is equal to
C
³
ak, (v∗i )
´
=
X
i
pi
³
ak
´
h (v∗i ) .
Now consider the interdependent implementation problem. Since we have
assumed that the firm knows that worker k has mistaken beliefs regarding
worker l’s productivity, that is pk
¡
al
¢
6= p
¡
al
¢
, the firm should take this
into account when choosing the optimal interdependent scheme. Making use
of this assumption, the assumption that workers’ production functions are
separable in actions, and the assumption that the random variables θ1 and
θ2 are independent, the firm’s interdependent implementation problem can
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be written as
min
{vij}
X
i
X
j
pi
³
ak
´
pj
³
al
´
h (vij)
s.t.
X
i
X
j
pi
³
ak
´
pkj
³
al
´
vij − c
³
ak
´
≥ Ū
(IR)X
i
X
j
h
pi
³
ak
´
− pi (a)
i
pkj
³
al
´
vij ≥ c
³
ak
´
− c (a) , a 6= ak.
(IC)
If pk
¡
al
¢
6= p
¡
al
¢
then there exist at least two output levels qm and qn
such that pkm
¡
al
¢
> pm
¡
al
¢
and pkn
¡
al
¢
< pn
¡
al
¢
, with m 6= n. If zm = 1,
zn = −pkm
¡
al
¢
/pkn
¡
al
¢
, and zi = 0, for all i 6= m,n, thenX
j
pj
³
al
´
zj < 0 =
X
j
pkj
³
al
´
zj ,
for p
¡
al
¢
6= pk
¡
al
¢
. Let (v̂ij) denote the interdependent incentive scheme
that adds εzj to worker k’s individualistic output contingent utility pay-
ments when worker l’s output is qj . That is, v̂ij = v∗i + εzj , with ε > 0. We
will show that: (1) (v̂ij) is feasible in the interdependent implementation
problem and (2) (v̂ij) has a lower implementation cost to the firm than (v∗i )
for small ε. Let us consider (1) first. It is obvious that (v̂ij) satisfies the
worker’s participation constraint, (IR). Replacing vij by v∗i + εzj in the left
hand side of the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint, (IC), yieldsX
j
pkj
³
al
´X
i
h
pi
³
ak
´
− pi (a)
i
v∗i + ε
X
i
h
pi
³
ak
´
− pi (a)
iX
j
pkj
³
al
´
zj ,
or, after simplifying terms,X
i
h
pi
³
ak
´
− pi (a)
i
v∗i .
Since, by assumption (v∗i ) is a solution to the individualistic implementation
problem we have thatX
i
X
j
h
pi
³
ak
´
− pi (a)
i
pkj
³
al
´
v̂ij =X
i
h
pi
³
ak
´
− pi (a)
i
v∗i ≥ c
³
ak
´
− c (a) , a 6= ak.
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So, (v̂ij) is feasible in the interdependent implementation problem. Let us
now consider (2). Taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of h around
the individualistic output contingent utility payments we have that
h (vij) ≈ h (v∗i ) + h0 (v∗i ) (vij − v∗i ) +
1
2
h00 (v∗i ) (vij − v∗i )2 . (5)
Making use of (5), the implementation cost of (v̂ij) is approximately equal
to
C
³
ak, (v̂ij)
´
≈
X
i
X
j
pi
³
ak
´
pj
³
al
´"
h (v∗i ) + h
0 (v∗i ) εzj +
h00 (v∗i ) (εzj)
2
2
#
or, after simplifying terms
C
³
ak, (v̂ij)
´
≈
X
i
pi
³
ak
´
h (v∗i ) + ε
X
i
pi
³
ak
´
h0 (v∗i )
X
j
pj
³
al
´
zj
+
1
2
ε2
X
i
pi
³
ak
´
h00 (v∗i )
X
j
pj
³
al
´
z2j . (6)
The second term on the right hand side of (6) is negative given that h0 is
positive and
P
pj
¡
al
¢
zj is negative. The third term on the right hand side
of (6) is positive given that
P
pj
¡
al
¢
z2j is positive and worker risk aversion
implies that h00 is positive. However, for a small enough ε the second term
on the right hand side of (6) is larger than the third. This implies that
C
¡
ak, (v̂ij)
¢
< C
¡
ak, (v∗i )
¢
. Q.E.D.
23
References
Baker, G., Jensen, M., and K. Murphy (1988). ‘Compensation and Incen-
tives: Practice vs. Theory,’ Journal of Finance, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, 593-
616.
Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2003). ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,’
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70, No. 3, 489-520.
Brozynski, T., Menkhoff, L., and U. Schmidt (2004). ‘The Impact of Ex-
perience on Risk Taking, Overconfidence, and Herding of Fund Managers:
Complementary Survey Evidence,’ mimeo, University of Hannover.
De la Rosa, L. (2005). ‘Overconfidence and Moral Hazard,’ University of
California, Berkeley, mimeo.
Fairchild, R. (2005).‘The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence, Asymmetric
Information, and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions,’ The ICFAI
Journal of Behavioral Finance vol II, no 4 . December 2005.
Gervais, S. and I. Goldstein (2004). ‘Overconfidence and Team Coordina-
tion,’ Duke University mimeo.
Grossman, J. and O. Hart (1983). ‘An Analysis of the Principal Agent
Problem,’ Econometrica 51, 7-45.
Hvide, H. K. (2002). ‘Pragmatic Beliefs and Overconfidence,’ Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 48, no. 1, 15—28.
Keiber, K. (2003). ‘Overconfidence in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent
Problem,’ Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=315299.
Krueger, J. (1998). ‘Enhancement Bias in the Description of Self and Oth-
ers,’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 24, 505—516.
Moscarini, G. and H. Fang (2005). ‘Morale Hazard,’ Journal of Monetary
Economics, Vol. 52, 749-777.
Mookherjee, D. (1984). ‘Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents,’
Review of Economic Studies, LI, 433-446.
Myers, D. (1996). Social Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Oberlechner, T. and C. Osler, 2004, ‘Overconfidence in Currency Markets,’
mimeo, University of Vienna and Brandeis University.
Rabin, M. (1998). ‘Psychology and Economics,’ Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, Vol. XXXVI, 11-46.
Squintani, F. (2006). “Equilibrium and Mistaken Self-Perception.” Eco-
nomic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 3, 615 - 641.
24
